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THE BOREN AMENDMENT AND
DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS
John A. Nyman, Ph.D.t
Simonetti Samuels, J.D., Ph.D.t t
I. INTRODUCTION
DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS (DEA) is a linear
programming method used to measure the relative efficiency of
firms.1 Given a data set that contains information on the inputs
and outputs of a series of firms, DEA will identify sets of
firms producing output with a similar mix of inputs and calcu-
late a measure of the degree to which each firm uses more
inputs than the most efficient firm in that firm's set.
DEA has two features that make it ideal for determining
the efficiency scores of healthcare firms. First, it is able to
make efficiency comparisons across firms that produce multiple
outputs. Because healthcare firms typically produce a variety of
services or provide services to a number of different patient
types, their efficiency scores can easily be calculated by DEA.
Second, DEA can measure efficiency independent of input
prices. This is useful if input prices are distorted or lacking,
which is also often the case for healthcare institutions. Because
DEA can so readily measure the efficiency of healthcare firms,
its application to Boren amendment cases seems natural.
t P.h.D., Economics, University of Wisconsin, Madison. The Author is currently an
Associate Professor in the Division of Health Services Research and Policy, University of
Minnesota.
tt J.D., Ph.D Economics, University of Wisconsin, Madison. The Author currently is a
partner at the law firm of Katten, Muchin and Zavis and serves as the Director of the Health Law
Research Institute at Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
1. For a complete description of this programming technique, refer to A. Chames, et al.,
Measuring the Efficiency of Decision Making Units, 3 EuR J. OPERATIONAL REs. 392-444
(1978).
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The Boren amendment establishes "efficiency" as one of
the basic criteria for determining whether the reimbursement
rates that states set for hospitals and nursing homes are reason-
able.2 Specifically, the Boren amendment stipulates that states
develop Medicaid reimbursement:
[R]ates... which the State finds, and makes assurances satis-
factory to the Secretary [of the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services], are reasonable and adequate to meet the costs
which must be incurred by efficiently and economically operat-
ed facilities in order to provide care and services in conformity
with applicable State and Federal laws, regulations, and quality
and safety standards.3
Neither Congress nor the Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA), however, has been forthcoming with substantial ad-
ditional guidance as to how to define or operationalize "effi-
ciency" in practice.
Over the years, states and the courts have used a number
of methodologies for satisfying the Boren amendment, but one
methodology appears to have gained ascendance. This Article
suggests that the methodology that states typically use to
satisfy the Boren amendment is arbitrary and does not conform
to conventional economic definitions of efficiency. This Article
further suggests that DEA can provide a superior method for
identifying efficient firms. In what follows, we discuss the
methodology typically used by states to satisfy the Boren
amendment and its weaknesses. We then show how DEA pro-
vides a superior methodology.
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1996).
3. Id.
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II. THE PRESENT METHODOLOGY
A. AMISUB (PSL), Inc. v. Colorado Department of Social
Services4 Methodology
As is apparent from its language, the Boren amendment is
a somewhat vague guideline for establishing an acceptable
reimbursement system. In passing this legislation, Congress
seemed to want to remove the constraints and regulations that
had burdened states and providers under the previous law.'
However, because of HCFA's refusal to further define the
terms or procedures in its regulations, it has been left largely to
the courts to interpret how the law is satisfied.6
Initially, courts were reluctant to comment on the appro-
priateness of the various substantive aspects of the reimburse-
ment systems, perhaps because of the complexity of the issues
involved.7 Instead, early decisions revolved more around pro-
cedural issues-issues upon which the courts were more accus-
tomed to ruling. The most important of these procedural rul-
ings was AMISUB (PSL), Inc. v. Colorado Department of So-
cial Services. This case was crucial because by establishing
procedures that states needed to perform in "finding" that its
rates were reasonable and adequate to cover the costs of "effi-
ciently and economically operated" facilities, it essentially
4. 879 F.2d 789,794(10th Cir. 1989).
5. See Simonetti Samuels, Interpreting Health Care Cost Containment Legislation: Good
Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala and Relative Institutional Competence, 4 SuP. CT. ECON. REV.
141, 173-76 (1995) (discussing the shortcomings and advantages of the judiciary, as well as
alternative institutions, in order to evaluate which institution is best suited to address questions
arising from Medicare reimbursement).
6. Gerard F. Anderson & Mark A. Hall, The Adequacy of Hospital Reimbursement Under
Medicaid's BorenAmendment, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 205,211 (1992) (explaining that the regulations
did not, for example, attempt to define an "efficiently" and "economically" operated provider
because the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services decided that Congress
intended the states to define those terms).
7. Id. at 214 (stating that procedural issues have played a significant role in several cases,
and as a result, resolutions of the procedural disputes imposed important constraints on the
manner in which the substantive issues were viewed). See also Samuels, supra note 5, at 175
(stating that the compromise that most courts have reached in reviewing these claims is to focus
on whether the state provided the appropriate procedural safeguards in modifying the state
Medicaid program, thus, avoiding an inquiry into the definition of an efficient facility).
8. 879 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir. 1989) (stating that HCFA approval is based on state
"assurances" of the state's "findings" that the state Medicaid plan is in compliance with federal
Medicaid laws and regulations).
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established an acceptable method by which each state could
implicitly define what "efficiently and economically operated"
meant.
In AMISUB, the State of Colorado's "findings" process
was challenged by a consortium of hospitals.9 The hospitals ar-
gued that to find that its rates were reasonable and adequate,
the State of Colorado simply asserted that the current expen-
diture for Medicaid provider reimbursement was consistent
with past budget appropriations. The court, however, did not
deem this procedure to be acceptable, and instead, suggested
that the plain language of federal Medicaid law mandates that
the State Medicaid Agency, at a minimum, make findings
which identify and determine:
(1) the efficiently and economically operated hospitals [herein-
after step one]; (2) the costs that must be incurred by such
hospitals [hereinafter step two]; and, (3) the payment rates
which are reasonable and adequate to meet the reasonable costs
that must be incurred by the efficiently and economically oper-
ated hospitals [hereinafter step three]."
This three-part AMISUB findings procedure has become the
dominant standard for Boren compliance. Thus, rather than
defining efficiency, the AMISUB decision establishes that it is
sufficient to merely identify efficient providers.
States typically use some variant of the following method-
ology to identify efficient providers and thereby accomplish
step one under AMISUB. The prototypical methodology is first
to calculate some unit cost ratio (for example, long-run average
costs per patient day, short-run marginal costs per patient day,
or allowable costs under the state Medicaid reimbursement
system per patient day) for each institution and then to rank the
institutions according to this ratio. Accommodation is some-
times made for fundamental differences across institutions (for
example, regional, urban/rural, or profit/non-profit differences)
by ranking like institutions separately. Efficiency is then deter-
mined by establishing a cutoff at some percentile or percentage
of the median (for example, the fiftieth percentile or one-hun-
9. See id. at 795.
10. Idat796.
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dred percent of the median) below which an institution is des-
ignated as efficient.
Next, steps two and three of the AMISUB procedure are
performed: the total cost of each efficient institution is com-
puted and compared with the revenues that would be forthcom-
ing under the state's Medicaid reimbursement system. If all, or
almost all of the "efficient" providers' costs are covered, the
state is deemed to be in compliance with the Boren amend-
ment.
B. Economists' Definition of Efficiency
The central problem with this approach is that nowhere in
economic theory is efficiency defined as firms with unit costs
below a given percentile or percentage of the median. Thus,
this definition is open to legal challenge because of its arbi-
trariness.
In economics (economics is primarily concerned with
efficiency, therefore, it appears to be the discipline with the
greatest claim on defining the term) the conventional definition
of "technical efficiency" is to produce a level of output (or
outputs) using a technology that does not waste resources. For
example, consider three firms producing an identical ten units
of output. Firm A uses three units of labor (L) and two units of
capital (K) to produce that amount of output. Firm B uses two
L and four K. Firm C uses three L and three K. Because we do
not know prices, we cannot tell how much each of these tech-
nologies costs in total, but we do know that Firm C is ineffi-
cient because it could have used a technology with one less
unit of K to produce the same output (as Firm A did). Thus,
conventionally, Firms A and B are technically efficient, but
Firm C is inefficient.
To put this in graphical perspective, Firms A and B would
lie on the isoquant - the locus of points in K,L - space that
represents all the combinations of L and K that produce ten
units of output without wasting resources. Firm C would lie off
the isoquant because it is inefficient.
Technical efficiency is the most fundamental level of
efficiency for a firm. The next level of efficiency, "economic
efficiency," is found by determining whether the firm has
1997] 339
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adopted a technology that minimizes costs. Here the technolo-
gy used is matched to the prices of inputs in the market in
which the firm is operating. To be economically efficient, the
firm chooses a technology that essentially uses more of the
relatively cheaper inputs, and less of the relatively expensive
inputs. If the firm is using the economically efficient input
combination, it is minimizing the costs of production given the
input prices in its market.
The technically and economically efficient firms in a
market may differ from those which are deemed efficient by
the unit-cost methodology. For example, some of the firms
identified as efficient under the unit-cost methodology could
actually be inefficient based on conventional definitions from
the discipline of economics. A firm might waste resources in
production or use the wrong input mix for the relative prices it
faces in the market, but because the prices are so low abso-
lutely, the firm falls in the efficient portion of the unit-cost
distribution. For analogous reasons, some firms identified as
inefficient under the unit cost methodology could actually be
efficient using an economist's definition because they are not
wasting resources or they use a cost-minimizing input mix,
even though all prices they face are high. This implies that the
unit-cost determination of efficient firms is not consistent with
conventional economic definitions of efficiency, and therefore,
are arbitrary.
C. Potential for Abuse
Not only is the unit-cost methodology arbitrary, but it can
also lead to abuse. States often use a percentile of a unit-cost
ranking to establish a maximum Medicaid payment. To satisfy
the Boren amendment, the state may define efficient fimns
using the same unit-cost distributions, but at a slightly lower
(i.e., a more restrictive one) percentile of that distribution.
Because the percentile used to identify efficient firms is set
lower than the percentile used to determine the maximum pay-
ment, the payment almost always covers the costs of the so-
called efficient firms.
For example, the State of Minnesota uses its nursing home
reimbursement rate setting method to calculate what it calls its
340 [Vol. 7:335
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"standard rate."' EEO status is determined by all those nurs-
ing homes whose costs are covered by the standard rate.'2 (As
long as at least fifteen percent of nursing homes are EEO,
Minnesota deems its methods are reasonable). In calculating
the standard rate, the limit is set at the sixtieth percentile for
care-related operating costs and at one-hundred percent of the
median for non-care related operating costs. 3 In calculating
the reimbursement rates, the cost limits are set at 125% of the
median for the care-related operating costs and 110% of the
median for the non-care related operating costs.14 It is, there-
fore, not surprising that almost all of the EEO nursing homes
have their costs covered by their reimbursement rate. Clearly,
under these circumstances, a measure of efficiency is needed
that is independent of the unit-cost distribution.
HI. AN ALTERNATIVE METHODOLOGY
A. DEA
The DEA procedure for determining efficiency conforms
exactly to the conventional textbook concept of technical effi-
ciency. In brief, DEA identifies firms that are producing a
given set of outputs with the fewest number of inputs, such as
Firms A and B in Figure 1.
11. See generally STATE OF MINNESOTA, FINDINGS PROCESS FOR MINNESOTA NURSING
FACIT (July 1, 1995) (on file with author).
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
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Efficiency Using DEA Analysis
Figure 1
These technically efficient firms comprise the "reference set,"
or the firms on the isoquant. DEA then calculates technical
efficiency scores for all the firms which are not on the isoquant
but which produce similar outputs and use a comparable input
mix. The efficiency score represents the ratio of the inputs
used by the relevant firm on the isoquant to the inputs used by
the firm in question. For example, in Figure 1 the efficiency
score of Firm C is the ratio of distance OC' to OC. Firms A
and B represent appropriate standards of comparison for Firm
C because they produce similar outputs and use similar ratios
of inputs. As firms become more efficient, their efficiency
scores approach 1, the score of firms that lie on the isoquant.
For the purposes of Boren, however, it is the identification
of the firms in the reference set that is important. Because no
other firms produce similar outputs with fewer resources than
the firms in the reference set, they are the technically efficient
firms. As a result, the first step in the AMISUB procedure is
satisfied using a methodology that is not arbitrary, but in keep-
ing with the conventional textbook definition of efficiency.
Despite this natural application of DEA, to our knowledge it
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has not been used to meet the Boren amendment requirements.
This no doubt stems in part from its complex technical nature,
but in part, it may also be due to a number of misguided ob-
jections to its use in this context.
B. DEA Criticisms: Missing Output Variables
DEA has been criticized for not including, or at least
holding constant, certain important output variables, such as
case-mix severity or quality of care. 5 If, say, case-mix is not
included, a nursing home might be considered inefficient be-
cause it has a low DEA efficiency score, but in reality, it uses
more resources because it has a more severely dehibilitated
clientele. In general, DEA would not accurately identify the
efficient firms to the extent that these outputs16 are either ob-
servable but not measured or not observable, and therefore, not
included in the DEA.
If case-mix or quality data are not included in the DEA
because these data were lacking, then such data could not be
used in a unit cost ranking either. If so, both DEA and unit-
cost analysis would yield similarly inaccurate results. DEA,
however, would still have the advantage that it is based on a
concept of efficiency that is more consistent with the conven-
tional theoretical concept.
If, instead, case-mix data were available and different
types of hospital or nursing home patients could be identified
based on the services they received, then such multiple outputs
could readily be incorporated into the DEA to determine the
(globally) efficient firms. In contrast, it would be difficult to
incorporate case-mix differences into a unit-cost ranking be-
cause, although different types of patients might be discemable,
it would be difficult to disaggregate the expenditures associated
with the various services each patient type received. Moreover,
even if it were possible to disaggregate the expenditures and
determine unit-cost rankings for each type of patient, the unit-
15. Joseph P. Newhouse, Frontier Estimation: How Useful a Tool for Health Economics?,
13 J. HEALTH EcoN. 317, 319-21 (1994) (stating that DEA estimations cause such severe
problems that they should not be used for reimbursement measures).
16. Case-mix differences and quality of care can both be regarded as dimensions of output.
See id. at 319-20.
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cost ranking method simply does not suggest a way to aggre-
gate the separate rankings to determine a globally efficient set
of firms.' 7
If quality measures were missing instead of case-mix
measures, again they would be missing regardless of whether
DEA or unit-cost ranking were used. The Boren language,
however, suggests that missing quality data may not matter.
Quality is embedded in the amendment in two places. First, it
is explicit in the requirement that nursing homes meet state and
federal regulatory standards for quality. Thus, in identifying the
EEO facilities, states often first exclude those facilities that
have had code violations in the previous year. Of course, the
number of violations and the period of time in violation that is
necessary to disqualify a facility from consideration as EEO is
subject to dispute, but if acceptable quality can be defined,
then it is possible to identify the firms that satisfy this Boren
condition.
Second, and perhaps more important, quality is implicit in
the directive that those facilities that are used as the standard
are not only efficiently, but economically operated as well. A
number of experts would define "economically" in terms of
quality: the states are not required to pay for luxury care or
care above a certain minimal level of resource use. Thus, a
facility that provides an opulent level of quality, and provides
it efficiently would not satisfy both "efficiently and economi-
cally operated" criteria. In practice, this would mean that it is
not necessary to distinguish efficiency from quality to satisfy
17. The exception to this is the case-mix indices used in the reimbursement of nursing
homes. Patients are distinguished according the expected resource use and each type has an index
number associated with it indicating the relative cost of those resources compared with some base
patient type. Such an index could be used to determine global, unit-cost ranking for all patient
types, where the units are calculated as the number of base patient equivalents.
A major problem with this approach is that it is not clear that the indices used to measure
the relative expected resource consumption reflect actual resource consumption, especially after
the system has been imposed and firms are able to respond to the incentive in these indices. For
example, John A. Nyman and Robert A. Connor show that the actual expenditures by Minnesota
nursing homes on the various patient types in its case-mix system are to a large extent
uncorrelated with the case-mix index that Minnesota uses for paying its nursing homes. John A.
Nyman & Robert A. Connor, Do Case-Mix Adjusted Nursing Home Reimbursements Actually
Reflect Costs? Minnesota's Experience, 13 J. HEALTH ECON. 145-62 (1994). If the relative costs
in the case-mix index are inaccurate, then the aggregation will also be inaccurate and, hence,
arbitrary. Id.
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the Boren amendment. Once the substandard facilities are
eliminated, the nursing homes that spent the least in unit costs
would be held up as meeting both criteria simultaneously.
Similarly, with DEA, a technically efficient facility might
appear off the frontier because it is providing higher quality
care or because it is providing minimal care inefficiently. In
either case, that facility would violate the Boren standard and
correctly be excluded from the list of EEO facilities.
In sum, if case-mix or quality information were missing, it
would not make DEA any less preferred to the unit-cost meth-
odology, because both would be open to the same criticism.
Moreover, if case-mix data were available, it could be more
readily incorporated into a DEA methodology than into a unit-
cost methodology. Finally, missing quality data may not be a
problem under either methodology given the Boren
amendment's requirement that the firms (representing the stan-
dard for the Boren test) be both efficiently and economically
operated.
C. DEA Criticisms: Methodological Factors
DEA has also been challenged because of some of its
methodological features. DEA is a mathematical, not statistical,
method for constructing an isoquant or production frontier.
Because of this, it has been criticized as being unrealistic. That
is, according to DEA, firms in the reference set are "efficient,"
but according to the statistical approach, such firms might sim-
ply be lucky. That is, even for the most efficient manager,
there are some aspects of the process of turning inputs into
outputs that are beyond his or her control. Two efficient man-
agers may make the same decisions, but because of random
error, one will be on the production frontier and the other will
not.
It has therefore been suggested that because of the exis-
tence of chance or random error, a statistical approach may be
preferred. A statistical approach would estimate a cost or pro-
duction function based on the average values of outputs and
inputs. While only the outlying firms (the most efficient) deter-
mine the reference set with the DEA, the statistical approach
uses all firms, efficient and inefficient, to construct the produc-
19971
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tion frontier. Deviation from this frontier is then decomposed
into a portion that represents random error and a portion that
represents managerial inefficiency. From this decomposition of
the error, it is possible to determine the degree of inefficiency
experienced by each firm.
The statistical approach may represent an improvement in
theory, but in practice and for the purposes of satisfying the
Boren amendment findings process, it is inferior to DEA. The
central methodological problem with a statistical frontier is that
it is based on the assumption that the random error is distribut-
ed normally and the managerial inefficiency is modeled by a
half-normal distribution. This assumption, however, cannot be
tested. Therefore, it can never be known whether the frontier-
defined efficient firm is truly efficient because of skill or
whether luck had something to do with it.
For Boren applications, however, the main problem with
frontier estimation is the same arbitrariness as was encountered
with the unit-cost distribution: firms can be ordered according
to the statistical measure of how efficient they are, but the
statistical approach does not embody a natural cut-off to distin-
guish the efficient firms from inefficient ones. Of course, one
firm could be designated as efficient because it had the highest
efficiency score of all firms in a state, but that is unrealistic. It
is not even clear that this firm would necessarily lie on the
estimated isoquant. That is, while a stochastic method might
identify an isoquant, it would only be by chance that any of
the firms in the state would lie on that isoquant. In contrast,
DEA identifies the isoquant by tracing out the input combina-
tions of each firm in the reference set. Each firm in the refer-
ence set represents the most efficient firm compared to all
those other firms that use a similar production technology.
Moreover, the government use of a statistical estimation
procedure would imply that some costs should be disregarded
because they stem from luck. As a result, the costs attributed to
a firm could be either higher or lower than they actually are.
For example, in determining the efficient finns, some low-cost
firns may be deemed inefficient because their costs "should
be" higher than they actually are. Likewise, some high-cost
fi-ms might be considered efficient. Often, the government
does not permit the substitution of hypothetical numbers for
346 [V/ol. 7:335
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actual numbers. For example, one cannot substitute "expected"
income for "actual" income when determining income tax
liabilities. This could be an important barrier to using a statisti-
cal approach.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the criticism that a
mathematical approach is unrealistic because it ignores chance
could also be leveled against a unit-cost ranking determination
of efficiency. Unit-cost ranking is mathematical because it
simply divides total expenditures by the number of units pro-
duced. A firm, however, might appear at the low or "efficient"
end of the unit-cost distribution not because of efficiency, but
because of luck.
D. Technical v. Economic Efficiency
We have noted that efficiency, as it is conventionally
thought of by economists, has two dimensions: technical and
economic. Technical efficiency refers to production that does
not waste inputs, while economic efficiency refers to using a
technology (input mix) that is sensitive to the relative prices in
the market, that is, one that minimizes costs. DEA has histori-
cally only addressed the former.
DEA, however, can be used to address economic efficien-
cy,'8 but to our knowledge only one empirical study has at-
tempted to measure economic efficiency.19 To determine
whether a technically efficient firm is also economically effi-
cient using DEA, it is necessary find the input prices faced by
the firm in the market in which the firm is located and deter-
mine whether the relative prices are within a certain range,
defined by the two reference set firns using the next most
similar technologies. For example, in Figure 1, Firm A could
face relative prices that range from a price ratio of PL/PK to
PL'/PK' and still be considered economically efficient.
18. Economic efficiency is sometimes referred to as allocative or input price efficiency.
19. See generally Merton D. Finkler & David D. Wirtschafter, Cost-Effectiveness andData
Envelopment Analysis, 18 HEALTH CARE MGMT. REv. 81, 81-88 (1993) (concluding that "the
robustness of the cost-effectiveness results, along with the magnitude of the savings potential
based on DEA and relative to that savings potential generated by averaging techniques, justifies
DEA's inclusion in the cost manager's tool kit").
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As a result, the existence of economic efficiency has both
theoretical and practical implications for the Boren amendment.
From a theoretical perspective, the addition of economic effi-
ciency to technical efficiency raises yet another barrier for a
firm being designated as "efficient." Thus, fewer firms would
be efficient, and the Boren amendment standard would presum-
ably be more easily met. From a practical perspective, howev-
er, the fact that each firm in the reference set could face a
different relative price ratio makes it possible for all firms that
are technically efficient to be economically efficient as well.
Even more important, each firm in the reference set could face
a range of input prices and still be considered economically
efficient. As long as the price ratio that the firm actually faced
fell in that range, it would be impossible to distinguish that
firm from others on the basis of economic efficiency. From a
practical perspective, therefore, the extension of the DEA to
identify both technically and economically efficient firms is not
likely to reduce the number of efficient firms substantially,
compared with simply identifying the technically efficient ones.
For legal purposes, the inclusion of economic efficiency in a
DEA would not necessarily make the Boren requirements more
easily met.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because neither Congress nor the Health Care Financing
Administration was clear about what "efficiency" means, defin-
ing the term fell to the states and the courts. Over time, a
standard methodology has been established that is based on
measures of relative efficiency, but this methodology lacks the
absoluteness that is embedded in the economists' conventional
defimition of the term. Data envelopment analysis, however, is
a method for determining efficient firms that is consistent with
the conventional economic definition of efficiency and lacks
the arbitrariness of the standard methodology. Thus, the avail-
ability of DEA has rendered the standard unit-cost methodolo-
gy inferior.
The substitution of DEA-determined efficient firms in the
Boren findings process may or may not reduce the number of
firms that are considered efficient compared to existing meth-
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odologies. Because efficiency has been defined relatively,
states may have included more firms in the ranks of efficient
providers to stave off accusations that the concept has been too
narrowly defined. For these states, converting from a unit-cost
analysis to a DEA analysis may result in a more stringently
defined group of firms and a greater likelihood that the existing
reimbursement system will cover their costs.
On the other hand, existing studies' suggest that between
forty and fifty percent of nursing homes would be in the ref-
erence set. These percentages probably are not all that different
from the percentages found in states using unit-cost methods,
and may even be greater.
The main advantages of DEA, however, are its lack of
arbitrariness and its consistency with conventional definitions
of efficiency. These features give DEA the potential to become
the standard methodology for satisfying the Boren amendment.
20. See, e.g., John A. Nyman & Dennis L. Bricker, Profit Incentives and Technical
Efficiency in the Production of Nursing Home Care, 71 REV. ECON. & STAT. 586,586-94 (1989)
(concluding that for-profit nursing homes have significantly higher efficiency scores than non-
profit homes); John A. Nyman et al., Technical Efficiency in Nursing Homes, 28 MED. CARE 541,
541-51 (1990) (concluding that relative technical efficiency is more commonly associated with
for-profit and larger firms).
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